An Economic Framework for Understanding Micro-Credit in Developing Countries by Turvey, Calum G. & Kong, Rong
 




Calum G. Turvey, PhD 
W.I. Myers Professor of Agricultural Finance 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
356 Warren Hall 
Cornell University 





Rong Kong, PhD 
Associate Professor 
College of Economics and Management 
Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University 
Yangling  Shaanxi 
kongrong1996@yahoo.com 
 
Paper prepared for Presentation at 
AAEA Annual Meeting 
Portland Oregon 
July 29-August 2 2007  
 
Copyright 2007 by Calum Turvey and Rong Kong. All rights reserved. Readers may make 
verbatim copiesof this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Abstract 
 
To reduce vulnerability and food insecurity this paper investigates the economics of 
micro-credit. We provide a model that shows how a micro-credit market based on trust can co-
exist with a commercial collateral-based market. This model is developed in detail and certain 
propositions are supported using dominant strategies in a trust-honour game based on the 
prisoner’s dilemma. From a policy point of view the theoretical model indicates that trust-based 
lending, coupled with certain incentives, can go far in supporting growth opportunities in 
developing countries. It is argued that development policy should be flexible enough to permit 
trust-based micro-lending to the poor, regardless of how counter-intuitive this must appear to the 
conventional wisdom.  
  1 
1. Micro Lending and Economic Development  
The vulnerabilities of peoples in developing countries to economic subterfuge are both 
persistent and degrading. The direct consequence is that hundreds of millions of households, 
mostly in rural areas, suffer from chronic economic hardship, and languish in a perpetual state of 
poverty and food insecurity.  The root causes of economic suffrage are many but it is well 
understood that the most vulnerable of populations, those in a persistent poverty trap, are those 
who lack physical and financial resources. By physical resources it is meant the economic 
resources, land, buildings, inputs  etc from which livelihoods are derived, and by financial capital 
it is meant the capital with which to acquire the physical resources. The stock of physical 
resources and the financial wherewithal to acquire those resources are inextricably linked. To 
many the root cause of the poverty trap is not the constraint on physical resources but the 
financial constraints or credit constraints that prohibit the acquisition of those resources to 
poverty-escaping scale. 
Until the past 20 or so years credit has been rationed to the poor because it is believed 
that the poor are not creditworthy, have limited or no collateral, and do not generate sufficient 
income with which to repay a loan. This applies not only to the acquisition of fixed resources 
such as land and buildings which could contribute to economies of size, but the purchase of 
variable inputs (seed, feed, fertilizer) which could enhance economies of scale. Given the ill-
effects of credit constraints it is no wonder that these constraints, above all hold the greatest 
shadow price, and the more vulnerable the household the greater this shadow price will be. 
More recently the traditional view of credit worthiness has been challenged. Nowhere has 
this been more apparent than the activities of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank that in 1978 started 
providing micro credit to poor households in rural areas. The escalation of micro-credit and 
micro-finance institutions (MFI) throughout the developing world has resulted in a burst of 
growth in some rural communities providing benefits in terms of rural entrepreneurship, growth, 
income enhancement, poverty reduction and increased food security and livelihoods(see reviews 
by Hartarska and Holtmann, 2006; Meyer and Nagarajan 2006 and Zeller 2006). While it is 
understood that micro-credit provides a counter-model for a non-collateral economy that is 
juxtaposed to the collateral based credit-rationing model of say Stiglitz and Weiss(1981), little 
formality has been given to Micro-Credit. The purpose of this paper is to provide such a 
  2framework. In this paper we use as a starting point the principles of Grameen-type lending since 
this type of no-collateral lending, together with incentive mechanisms such as self help groups 
that embolden trust, has proved to be in many instances adopted and successful. 
 
2. Economics and Trust 
Yunus (1999) argues that the poor are creditworthy because they are trustworthy. Yet the 
role of trust in an economic system is not well understood and the idea that trust can substitute 
for the conventional metrics of profitability, liquidity, leverage and repayment capacity found in 
conventional credit scoring or risk rating models (e.g. Turvey 1991; Turvey and Brown 1990) is 
foreign to the conventional lender. For this reason the conventional economic models, including 
the lending models of Stiglitz and Weiss have excluded vulnerable populations. But why should 
trust-based micro-lending work? Is trust induced by economic circumstance, or are incentives to 
make one trustworthy required to induce trust, suggesting that one is innately trustworthy? Or is 
trust simply innate? Consider the rational description provided by James (2002) that is deciding 
on whether agent A should trust another agent B, the economic approach is for A to investigate 
the incentives that B has either to honour or dishonour the trust offered by A. If B has an 
incentive to be trustworthy then A will trust B. Rabin (1993) considers a “fairness equilibrium” 
in which people like to help those who are helping them but are willing to hurt those that do not, 
even if the cost of the latter exceeds all possible benefits. James (2002) argues that such thinking 
assumes that all agents are rational utility maximizers, and that people are honest only to the 
extent that the appearance of honesty or honesty itself pays more than dishonesty. In other 
words, one is trustworthy if he does not have the incentive to exploit others. 
This is of course a depressing view of human behaviour, but it is endemic. The use of 
credit scoring models for example assumes dishonesty first; only experience brings about trust. 
And the economic justification for this presumption is that inherent in any economy some 
numbers of unidentifiable individuals, the vast minority, are for whatever reason dishonest. 
There is also evidence that trust-based economies outperform other economies in terms of 
economic growth (Fukuyama 1995;Beugelsdijk et al 2004)  and trust plays an integral part in the 
reduction of transactions costs (Chiles and McMackin 1996). In terms of credit the number of 
loan defaults or arrearages will far exceed the number of dishonest players for it is true that an 
honest person, by circumstance rather than sloth, may at one time or another be unable to meet 
  3the obligation. The problem is that what is ultimately observed is the default ex post rather than 
the probability of default ex ante.  
But in repeated experiments such as the Grameen Bank lending based on trust appears to 
work. To a large extent this may be based on the use of self help groups which act as a collective 
to enforce trust. The recurring question, from an economic point of view, is how and why this 
works. It appears perhaps that there are two separate but not mutually exclusive games at play. 
First, if the borrower is a group then there is a game of mutual enforcement within the group to 
ensure equal effort. Thus the group becomes trustworthy. Second there is the game between the 
borrower (individual or group) and the lender (an NGO or MFI). 
The game within the group is a simple one based lightly on the prisoner’s dilemma. Here 
a group member can take action to reduce effort ( the free rider effect)  but must consciously 
absorb the fact that the remaining members can individually or as a group take an opposing 
action against him. Kindle and Lazear (1992) introduce a ‘Peer Pressure” function that integrates 
with utility to affect behaviour. Here the function  ( ) ; , ,..., , , , ,..., ijk nijk n Pee e e aa a a  captures the 
pressure that is felt by participanti, which depends on his own effort, , and the efforts of others, 
, as well as the joint actions that he and group members can take . There 
are    separate games played out, each with imperfect information about the actions of the 
remaining members of the group or the collective action of the group itself. If agent i  is 
dishonest the collective response of the group could do more harm than good. The same applies 
to all agents. Consequently none will reveal themselves and the group will act as one. In other 
words, it may be the case that all group members are dishonest and would enjoy a free ride, but 
in the absence of information about other members’ intentions, all individuals behave with 
honesty and the group becomes trustworthy (James 2002). 
i e
,..., k e n e , , ,..., ijk n aaa a
n
Now consider the game between a lender and a borrower. Unless the group members 
conspire, the lender will look upon the group more favorably than an individual.  Consider the 





  4  Borrower   
   Honour Exploit 
Lender  Trust  ,()( 1 ) iD C D i D − + , (1 ), ( ) Di C D −+
  Distrust  0, (0) ( ) 0 CC D − <   0,0 
Figure 1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix to Trust -Honesty Game 
 
If the lender trusts the borrower and the borrower is honourable then a loan is made 
raising consumption of the borrower by  ()( 1 ) CD iD − +   and returning revenue to the lender 
of .  If the borrower is dishonest and is wanting to exploit the trust and not repay the loan, then 
the lender loses principal plus interest, 
iD
(1 ) Di + , while the borrower benefits to the gross value of 
. If the lender distrusts the borrower then no loan is offered resulting in no gain or loss to 
the lender but an opportunity cost to the borrower of
() CD
(0) ( ) 0 CC D − < . The final pair is 0,0 for the 
distrust-exploit pair. 






− =  then gains in trust-
honour are equal and the lender then has no dominant strategy. In this situation, the lender 
having knowledge of the borrower’s exploitive possibility will make no loan and a Nash 






− < , then the lender has a dominating strategy in 
honour-trust. But this also means that if the borrower exploits the trust the lender has more to 
lose. Again the Nash equilibrium is distrust-exploit.  Ultimately, what this suggests is that in the 
presence of exploitive nature by a borrower no loans would be made. 
But in micro credit loans are made, which suggests that to many pairs, trust-honour is a 
Nash equilibrium. How can this be? The trust-honour game provides no incentive for good 
behaviour. For example, if the lender knew that the borrower would not default then clearly 
trust-honour is an equilibrium. But borrowers represent an adversely selected group so there is 
no way that an exploiter can be identified a priori. Consequently the lender will provide the 
incentive that if the borrower honours the obligation then there will be a second opportunity to 
borrow, but if there is default then all opportunity for future borrowing cedes. In this case the 
trust-honour cell will accumulate over two periods as ( ) 2,( 2)( 1) 2 iD C D i D −+  whereas  the 
remaining cells will remain as is. The borrower’s exploit choice will dominate the honour choice 
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>− . In other words if the lender is non-
exploitative in interest rates then the likelihood of default diminishes and trust-honour is a Nash 
equilibrium. Obviously if the borrower incorporates the loss of all future borrowings then for 







<−   and again trust-honour becomes a Nash 
equilibrium. Interestingly if we consider two individuals such that  then the 
incentives for i to exploit the trust of the lender will be lower than
() () ij CD CD >
j . It is on this basis that we 
proceed with the model of the micro-credit market. 
 
3. A Micro-Credit Equilibrium 
To keep the model simple we stick to the two major assumptions implied by the Grameen 
Model. These are a) that the poor place a higher value on money than the rich and b) that the 
poor have a higher probability of loan repayment than the rich. We define the loan value function 
as a measure of utility  ( ) V ω where the dependent variable is measured as a % and the 
independent variable is measured as income,ω . The value function can be viewed as a schedule 
representing a willingness to pay for credit and it is assumed, quite reasonably, that  ( ) '0 V ω < ; 
that is the value placed on the next dollar available, and hence the willingness to pay for that next 
dollar, is decreasing in income. In other words, the poor are willing to pay a higher interest rate 
than the rich. The supply of funds is measured by the loan default function  () L ω as an increasing 
function of income (e.g. ) with the dependent variable representing a percentage cost 
(expectation) of loss and the independent variable is again income. This function is unusual and 
is based on the premise, as expressed by Yunus, that the poor are more trustworthy than the rich. 
However, since most applications of micro-credit involve the poor with little or no collateral, 
much of the lending decisions of micro-credit revolve around trust. Hence, 
() ' L ω > 0
() L ω  can be viewed 
as a schedule for the trust in repayment and assumes that in the absence of collateral that the rich 
are more likely to default than the poor.  
 
 
The general form of welfare is given by  
  6(1)  () ()
*
0 max WV L
ω
d ω ωω =− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫  
 
Where 
* ω represents the barrier between  ( ) ( ) 0 VL ωω − ≥ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  and () ( ) 0 VL ωω −< ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . 
We further define 
 
(2)  ( )
1 VA
β ω ω




β ω ω =  
Where  1 β   is the marginal value of the next dollar of income and  2 β is the marginal 
propensity to default. Equation (2) can be viewed as a vulnerability schedule in that it places a 
much higher value on the marginal dollar for the poor, while a low value is given to the rich. 
Equation (3) in contrast might be viewed as a corruptibility schedule which associates greater 
moral hazard of loan default and bad debts with the rich rather than the poor.  
 












































































  7In other words we characterize vulnerability as a decreasing function of income that 
decreases at an increasing rate. This suggests that the poorer one becomes in terms of income the 
greater the value of money.  
The L () function is always increasing. In other words the model assumes a corruptible 
population in which higher income leads to a lower value of money and hence with less ‘respect’ 
for money a higher chance of default. This is of course a broad generalization and should not 
suggest that the wealthy will default as a matter of course but rather that the propensity to default 
will be higher for the wealthy. The slope of the default curve is determined by the elasticity. If 
2 1 β > then the function increases at an increasing rate. In the figures we present this is the 
assumption made. However if  2 1 β = the default function is constant indicating that the 
propensity to default is linearly related to income. Finally if  2 1 β <  the propensity to default is, 
on margin, higher for lower income people than higher income people. Higher income people 
will still default more than lower income people but the increase in the propensity to default gets 
incrementally smaller as income rises. 
The coefficients  1 β  and  2 β represent the respective elasticities, or the percentage change 
in V() or L() with respect to a percentage change in income. In other words if  1 β  is 0.5 then a 1% 
increase in income will reduce the utility value of  money by 0.5% and if  2 β  is 0.5 then a 1% 
increase in income will increase the propensity to default by 0.5%. 
 
The welfare maximizing level of income is given by the intersection of the value and loan 
default curves  () () VL ω ω = Or 
(4) 
12 AB
β β ω ω
− = . 
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  8According to the rule, any loans below 
* ω  will be made using micro credit while loans 
above 
* ω  will be denied and the borrower will be required to seek credit elsewhere.  
 





















In other words if the marginal value of money increases the wealth threshold decreases. 
Likewise if the marginal propensity to default increases the wealth threshold decreases. The 
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We refer to this rate, at least theoretically, as the Grameen rate because it applies to all 
loan applicants below 
* ω . 
 
  9However, there are a number of variants of this model. The interest rate charged in (9) is 
not determined by market rates but by the value to the holder so it may well be that  where 
r is the commercial loan rate. Suppose further that a government observing the spread between 
the micro-credit rate and the commercial rate decides to impose by fiat a maximum rate on micro 
loans so that  . At r* ,  




















So that the threshold for loans widens, more loans are accepted, and loan risks increase. 
That is  
















The basic structure is illustrated in Figure 2 with the borrower’s valuation curve V(), downward 
sloping and the lender’s loss curve L() increasing. The equilibrium is at 





















* ω , L()>V() indicating that losses exceed the willingness to pay. Hence loans to the right 
of 
* ω  are denied  micro-credit loans and forced into the commercial market. Loans to the left of 
* ω  are considered for micro-credit at the rate V*.  In this model V* applies to all micro-credit 
loans regardless of how poor the borrowers are.  The social benefits to the poor are defined by 
  10the area above V* and below the V() schedule, while benefits to the NGO or MFI that provides 
these loans is measured by the area below V* and above L(). 
 
There are three artifacts of the model that require theoretical foundation.  First, the value 
function  ( ) V ω  is decreasing in ω , Second,  ( ) L ω  is increasing in ω  and third  an equilibrium 
at 
* ω exists below which micro credit is made and above which micro credit is denied.  
 
For the first proposition we apply expected utility defined over the variables  ,, CDω ; 





















The first part of (12) holds by monotonicity of the utility function whereas the second 








  represents the change in the 

















 by assumption of the leveraging effect of 
credit. 
  The second proposition is more difficult. First assume two individuals with 
different income endowments such that   ij ω ω < . We further assume a point of satiation in 
consumption exists such that the marginal benefit of additional consumption units leveraged by 











. A consumption relation 





 states that the marginal increase in consumption of a poor individual will be 
higher than the marginal increase in consumption of the wealthier individual. By concavity of the 
consumption function it must be true that  j i CC >  and  max max j i CC CC − <− . We introduce the 
concept of a reneging temptation and define the following function  ( ) max k CC Γ−  and its shape 







. In other words, the smaller the value of   max k CC − , the greater will be the 
temptation to default. Thus, when considering the dominating trust-exploit strategy in Table 1 
(e.g. () (1 ), ( ) D iC D −+ ) then we can state that because  j i CC > , then the rich agent  j  will have a 
greater propensity to exploit than the poorer agent i.  
 
We can take this a step further by assuming that T, the number of periods for which 


















 are reasonable properties of the game that suggest not only the existence 
of a reneging temptation but also its various forms. In terms of Figure 1, as ω  increases, the 
welfare benefits from micro-credit decrease quite rapidly (i.e.  ( ) ( )
* lim 0 VL
ωω →
→ ωω − ) and 
.   () 0 T ω →
Interestingly, if there is no information passed between the micro-credit market and the 
commercial market (beyond 
* ω   ) then most surely the reneging temptation will be high. 
However if credit reports are passed from the micro-credit market to the commercial market then 
most likely the reneging temptation will be diminished. 
 
Finally, the value function  ( ) V ω  is decreasing in ω ,  ( ) L ω  is increasing in ω  then an 
equilibrium at 




4. Preliminary Findings Assessment of Rural Credit Cooperatives in China  
 
In this section we examine rural credit in China as it relates to efforts by the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives to provide micro-credit to rural farms and households. 
  12Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) in China are regulated formal financial institutes 
which provide micro credit to farmers. Basically RCCs  classify farmers in their precincts by  
different credit levels firstly and then according to the credit level  decide upon the sum of loans 
given to farmers in range ￥1000 to ￥20000. Considering sustainability and profitability,  RCCs 
usually prefer to choose those farmers who are in the middle class in terms of income as 
principal  clients. Farmers with lower income have great difficulty in obtaining  loans from RCC. 
Moreover, loans only can be used in producing rather than consuming. More generally, the   
Chinese central government sets a regulated policy for micro credit lending and the interest rate  
on RCC loans is considerably lower than the rate offered by MFIs or NGOs and  can not be 
exceeded. A ceiling limitation on the lending rate legislated is set but RCC rates can fluctuate 
within a scale under the ceiling limitation.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 which maps onto figure 1 the RCC Rate Schedule. Note that 
the RCC discriminates between borrowers, with higher rates charged to the poor,  Note also that 
the RCC rate is everywhere below the MFI rate defined by point A. Several things are suggested 
by this market. First because the RCC offers a lower rate it is attractive to borrowers between 
* ω  
and  1 ω . If the RCC views income as a metric it will prefer these loans and incur losses.  In fact, 
under the model assumptions the RCC will profit only for loans below  2 ω . The policy 
implications are important. First, by offering low interest micro credit loans the RCC is crowding 










ω* ω2  ω1
Figure 3  Conceptual model one of rural micro credit 














  13A variant of figure 3 is provided in figure 4. Here, the upper end of the flexible rates 
allowed exceeds the equilibrium rate of the MFI/NGO. Here we find incomplete crowding out. 
The RCC crowds out the MFI to the right of  3 ω . To the left of  3 ω borrowers would prefer the 
lower MFI rate suggesting that even in the presence of a central credit policy in China, there is 
some room for MFIs and NGOs to make micro credit loans. 
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Figure 4 Conceptual model two of  rural micro credit 
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Unfortunately, this is not what is observed in China. An examination of the history of 














In Figure 5 the L() curve bends back at lower income levels. This need not be associated 
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  14loans according to a conventional schedule. As a result neither MFIs nor NGOs will lend below 
4 ω  and the RCC will not provide micro-credit below  3 ω . The market for MFI loans is limited 
only to the range of income between  3 ω  and  4 ω . Borrowers below  4 ω  are in fact credit rationed.  
In the absence of credit below  4 ω  there exists a market for informal lending through 
money lenders who are more willing to exploit through usurious rates the willingness of the poor 
to pay high rates. The money lender schedule is described in Figure 3 by the curve  ( ) M ω  and 
rates to the poor will exceed  .  Money lenders are crowded out of the market by either the 
RCC or the MFI/NGO at incomes to the right of 
m r
4 ω . 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Further Work 
Our approach is pedagogical but the model provides an economic structure to micro-
credit that is fundamentally different from the collateral-based models of lending. The model can 
be used to describe a number of different micro-credit scenarios. For example (2) and (3) 
illustrate how the Grameen Bank operates its micro loans in Bangladesh. In other jurisdictions 
such as in China, the Central Policy is to offer low interest rate micro-credit to farmers. These 
rates are below the MFI rate. The consequence is that the Rural Credit Cooperatives that 
administer the loans accept some loans that would otherwise be untrustworthy and hence the 
default rate amongst many credit cooperatives in China is high (lower trust loans). In addition the 
Central rate is below the MFI rate so the number of NGO’s or MFI’s in China is lower than in 
other countries. China’s cooperative banking system has not fully endorsed either the self-help 
group model or the notion of trust as a form of capital. Thus in China, the very poor are credit-
constrained from the micro-credit market. In India, MFI’s such as BASIX have made headway 
into micro-credit and other forms of finance. However, commercial banks are also involved in 
micro-credit and both are largely promoted by rural development NGO’s. Unlike China, the 
micro-credit lenders in India, largely through the use of self-help groups, lend fundamentally on 
trust and are focused largely on the poor in rural areas. One variant of the model explains how an 
MFI can co-exist with subsidized credit from Government banks. Here, the MFI does not micro-
lend to the very poor. This created a void which was filled by Government bank lending. The 
  15model also shows how the emergence of micro-credit has affected informal lending and usury 
rates from money lenders.  
We believe that a credit framework based on trust rather than assets can be used to 
explain, from an economic point of view, much of what is observed in micro-credit lending in 
agriculture. The pedagogy of the model should be of broad interest to development economists 
studying micro-credit and agricultural finance scholars studying alternative lending models. 
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